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ABSTRACT
One of the Internet’s greatest strengths is the degree to which
it facilitates access to any of its resources from users any-
where in the world. However, users in the developing world
have complained of websites blocking their countries. We
explore this phenomenon using a measurement study. With
a combination of automated page loads, manual checking,
and traceroutes, we can say, with high confidence, that some
websites do block users from some regions. We cannot say,
with high confidence, why, or even based on what criteria,
they do so except for in some cases where the website states
a reason. We do report qualitative evidence that fears of
abuse and the costs of serving requests to some regions may
play a role.
1. INTRODUCTION
During a stay in Ghana, one of our colleagues no-
ticed that she could not access westelm.com [9]. Visits
to a variety of other websites revealed more unavail-
ability: travel websites like Orbitz and Expedia did not
permit Accra, Ghana, to be selected as a travel des-
tination; her attempt to use PayPal launched a “ran-
dom” security screening that required her to retrieve
a code from her phone in the United States (inacces-
sible to her in Ghana) before proceeding. The dating
site plentyoffish.com disallowed users from selecting
Ghana as their country of residence, then later stated
that they blocked all traffic from Africa [9]. Prior to
2015, Amazon did not allow shipping to Nigeria [2].
In this work, we quantitatively demonstrate that such
unavailability is a measurable phenomenon. Despite the
anecdotal and qualitative evidence for it, we know of
no systematic studies of the differences in server-side
blocking rates across regions. Rather, we find an abun-
dance of measurements of censorship, some of which
risk counting server-side blocking motivated by reasons
other than censorship. This risk highlights the first im-
portance of measuring regional differences more gener-
ally: a baseline to which to compare when looking at
more specific forms of it and for interpreting regional
differences in the unavailability of websites.
The second importance is that, as highlighted above,
such regional differences can adversely affect would-be
website visitors. This adversity can be understood both
in terms of individuals and in terms of the populations
affected. Our measurements show cases where much, if
not all, of a region is blocked.
We measure the unavailability of a website caused
by that website itself through actions or inactions of
the website’s server (including CDNs working on behalf
of the website’s operators). We term this server-side
blocking. To do so, we use network measurements to
find blocking at various network layers. We then use ad-
ditional measurements to differentiate between server-
side blocking and blocking by middleboxes (as seen with
censorship). We also characterize the methods used for
server-side blocking.
Our measurements use the following steps:
1. Measure the availability of websites from vantages
inside and outside of a region expected to experi-
ence regional server-side blocking,
2. Find region-wide patterns of availability and un-
availability,
3. Manually confirm the unavailability of websites,
and
4. Identify server-side blocking using traceroutes.
The main novelty of our methods is the use of traceroute
to confirm that a server is doing the blocking whereas
previously only cases where the website volunteered this
information were possible to identify. Along the way, we
use a mix of automated and manual methods to char-
acterize unavailability in terms such as network errors,
block pages, captchas, and more.
We ran our tests to compare to developing regions
with the US. We found 42 websites to be unavailable
in Pakistan. Of these, we were able to determine with
high confidence that 14 websites were using server-side
blocking. Unexpectedly, a large fraction of these are
websites are in India, not the developed world. For
vantages in Africa, we found 19 to be unavailable and
13 to be so from server-side blocking.
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These findings are subject to false positives and false
negatives. Due to the lack of research on server-side
blocking of regions, we focus on demonstrating its ex-
istence with high confidence instead of attempting to
measure all of it. With this in mind, we err on the
side of false negatives and underestimate the extent of
such blocking, which partly explains the small number
of websites we flag as such. For example, we manually
inspect every website we claim to be engaged in server-
side blocking. Furthermore, we focus on methods can
confirm blocking as being server-side without relying
upon the website to announce this fact or be truth-
ful about it. This requires time-consuming traceroutes,
which also limits the number of websites we identify.
One may wish to drawn conclusions about issues such
as censorship or discrimination from our findings. We
offer caution here, not only because these terms are
vague, contested, and nominative, but also because our
network-level measurements can at best serve as prox-
ies for most common definitions of these concepts. For
example, censorship typically describes a third-party in-
terfering with communications between willing partici-
pants and includes server-side blocking due to govern-
ment orders but not server-side blocking due to concerns
over fraud and abuse. Thus, server-side blocking and
censorship are about two orthogonal, although not in-
dependent, issues: who is doing the blocking and upon
whose orders.
The relationship between our measurements and dis-
crimination is even more complex. Our measurements
certainly do not distinguish the willful targeting and
harming of a group from implementing needed security
precautions, or even from accidental misconfigurations.
Only in the a subset of cases can we even say that the
blocking of a vantage in a region is because the vantage
is in that region.
However, the law also contains notions of indirect dis-
crimination, such the US’s notion of disparate impact.
We can draw an analogy between our findings and this
notion. Disparate impact considers large differences be-
tween groups receiving some adverse outcome concern-
ing enough to warrant justification. Only in the absence
of such justification do the differences raise to the level
of being illegal. Similarly, we believe our findings are
concerning from the perspective of nondiscrimination
but not necessarily problematic. Section 7 considers
these issues in more detail.
Needing justifications to put our measurements into
context, we also conducted a more qualitative exami-
nation of social media and web forums to gain some
insight into the causes and effects of such blocking.
Two prominent causes are concerns over security and
the costs of serving traffic to regions with high costs of
doing so. The security concerns include not just hacking
but also fraud, such as Nigerian 419 scams [1], Amazon
delivery scams [45], and dating scams [36]. From the
websites’ points of view, their services suffer monetary
loss from such abuse, and blacklisting the IP addresses
of a region associated with such abuse provides a low-
cost way of reducing such loss. We also find that serving
traffic to the developing world can be more expensive
than doing so to the developed world, which could re-
duce the willingness of websites to serve some regions.
Turning to the effects, we found not only annoyed for-
eigners1, but also disrupted online shopping experiences
for locals. More generally, with many key services, such
as education, commerce, and news, offered by a small
number of web-based Western companies that might
not view the developing world as worth the costs, these
indiscriminate blanket blocks could slow the growth of
blocked developing regions.
2. RELATEDWORK
While we believe ours to be the first study dedi-
cated to detecting and understanding server-side web-
site blocking in the developing world, we are not the
first notice the phenomenon. Prior work has qualita-
tively analyzed regional discrimination. Burrell [9] an-
alyzed regional discrimination from the perspective of
two types of actors on the Internet: Internet users in
Ghana (including both ordinary users as well as scam-
mers) and Western webmasters. By observing and in-
terviewing Ghanaian Internet users she identified con-
fusion that arises from the social differences between
Ghana and the West. For example, asking for money
or gifts from potential partners is socially acceptable
in Ghana, but Ghanaians get blocked on online dating
sites for doing so. Her analysis of one webmaster forum
(WebmastersWorld.com) showed that Western web ad-
mins view Africa as a source of Internet abuse without
any legitimate users, and often advise other admins to
blacklist the entire continent for abuse originating from
only one region.
In addition to such qualitative evidence at least one
study measured unavailability from a developing coun-
try. Bischof et al. studied Internet connectivity in Cuba,
focusing on routes, performance, and availability [7].
They found that 111 (2.5%) of 4,434 tested domains
(those websites of Alexa top 10k that support HTTPS)
to be unavailable in Cuba. They find unavailability to
be particularly common among websites related to fi-
nance, ad networks, computer hardware, and adult con-
tent. Observing that 51 of the 111 (46%) unavailable
domains are also unavailable in Sudan, they conclude
that US sanctions might play a role given that both
countries are subject to them.
Johnson et al. study Internet use in the village of
Macha, Zambia [29]. The village network reached the
1See, e.g., Vint Cerf on Verizon blocking: https://
twitter.com/vgcerf/status/903723705838252032
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Internet via a proxy and satellite link. They found
that 2.39% of the proxy responses were HTTP 503 Ser-
vice Unavailable, 1.98% were 504 Gateway Timeouts,
and 0.25% were 502 Bad Gateway. They attribute this
unavailability to the proxy being overloaded. Follow-
up work found that failure rates remained high after
switching to a faster link with flows of large size being
more likely to fail [57]. They attribute their findings to
changes in Internet use driving bandwidth consumption
up.
Others have studied issues with Internet connectivity
in the developing world (e.g., [14, 25, 27, 29, 28, 57, 10,
56, 22, 30, 16, 41, 17]). For example, Zaki et al. con-
ducted a measurement study to understand the high la-
tency of the web in Ghana [56]. They conclude that the
large number of connections needed to load webpages
with redirections and remote content strains the local
DNS and caching infrastructure. To reach this conclu-
sion, they loaded webpages from both locations within
Ghana and from control locations (e.g., New York), in
a fashion similar to our study. Gupta et al. come to
similar conclusions [22].
Kende and Rose report that hosting websites in Africa
is more expensive for African websites than hosting
them outside of Africa [30].
Another study of Macha, Zambia, found that much of
the traffic must leave the village over a slow satellite link
to reach services, such as Facebook, despite being a mes-
sages between village residents [28]. Fanou et al. study
content providers in Africa and the routes between them
and users, focusing Google’s cache network [17]. They
find poor connectivity between networks within Africa,
sometimes making it faster for an African network to
access data outside of African than that of a different
network within Africa. This finding perhaps explains
another of their findings: many websites local to Africa
are hosted outside of Africa.
Given our suspicion that some of the unavailabil-
ity is from security-motivated server-side blocking, we
find works studying such blocking of Tor exits relevant.
Khattak et al. performed a broad, systematic enumera-
tion and characterization of websites and IP addresses
that treat Tor users differently from normal connec-
tions [31]. They ran two complementary measurement
campaigns: (1) At the network layer, they scanned the
entire IPv4 address space (with a small exclusion list);
(2) At the application layer, they probed the top 1,000
Alexa websites. At the network layer, they estimated
that at least 1.3 million IP addresses that would oth-
erwise allow a TCP handshake on port 80 blocked the
handshake if it originates from a Tor exit node. At
the application layer, on average 3.6% of the top 1,000
Alexa websites blocked access from Tor users.
Singh et al. further explores this issue, attempting
to determine the motivations and methods behind Tor
blocking [47]. As with Khattak et al.’s study [31], they
crawl the web using Tor and without using Tor to de-
tect Tor blocking, but they also search for additional
forms of blocking: websites preventing logging in or us-
ing search functionality. To understand why blocking
happens, they analyze email complaints sent to exit op-
erators, including for exits they set up, to see what sorts
of abuse webmasters complain about and whether they
are associated with various attributes of the exits. They
also analyzed IP blacklists to understand how Tor exit
nodes get onto them.
Another line of work focuses on measuring specific
types of geographic discrimination on the Internet. Mikians et al.
examine price discrimination on e-commerce websites
based on geolocation [37, 38]. Using Planet Lab nodes
from 6 locations (New York, Los Angeles, Germany,
Spain, Korea, and Brazil), they showed that the price
of certain products, such as e-books, computer games,
and office supplies, differ between buyers at different
locations.
Vissers et al. looked for, but did not find, price dis-
crimination for flights based upon location and other
attributes (OS, browser, DNT setting, browsing history,
and cookie settings) [52].
During April 2016, Amazon’s Prime Free Same-Day
Delivery service was not available in the predominantly
black neighborhoods in the major cities such as Atlanta,
Boston, and New York [26]. Amazon claims that the
apparent discrimination is a result of minimizing the
cost of the same-day service by offering it only to areas
with with high numbers of Prime users.
Others measured the effects of geolocation on web
search results [23, 54, 32] and on maps [48].
More generally, researchers have searched for differen-
tiation based on other attributes. Hannak et al. looked
price discrimination and price steering (reordering of
items to highlight specific products) on e-commerce sites
based on features including logging in, OS, browser, and
account history [24]. Their research showed price differ-
ences due to logging in (Orbitz and Cheaptickets), due
to click and purchase history (Priceline), due to browser
(Travelocity and Home Depot), and due to A/B testing
(Expedia and Hotels.com). Others have looked at ad
personalization [21, 4, 53, 49, 34, 5, 33, 12, 51, 15, 50,
40, 8].
3. DESIGNINGTHEEXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this section, we discuss how we design and cal-
ibrate our experimental set-up. In particular, we de-
scribe how we eliminate any website unavailability that
can happen due to an artifact of crawler design, as such
unavailability is uninteresting for our study.
3.1 Crawler Design
Our experiments have two design requirements: (i)
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replicate the browser behavior experienced by real users
and (ii) detailed connection-level error logging. The for-
mer ensures that the blocking we are experiencing is not
an artifact of our crawler, and the latter enables us to
differentiate cases of local network issues and censorship
from server-side blocking.
We considered two drivers, Selenium and Python’s
Requests package, for fetching the websites, and com-
pared the two with varying header settings to enumerate
the different reasons that can lead to website unavail-
ability.
Below we discuss our findings on a sample of Alexa
top 500 websites:
• Timeout: We first investigated the effect of the
time-out value used. We observed a significant re-
duction in the number of websites that time-out
(from 43 down to 7), when increasing the time-
out value from 10 to 30 seconds. Increasing the
time-out value from 30 to 60s does not offer much
advantage, but a few websites become accessible
at 75s.
• User Agent: We observed at least seven websites
being unavailable when using the default user-agent
for Requests. Six of these resulted in a 403 Forbidden
with the default User Agent, but responded with
a 200 OK when the fetch was attempted with Re-
quests using the Firefox User Agent (e.g., theverge.
com, glassdoor.com, and udemy.com). One web-
site (Redd.it) responded with a 429 Too Many
Requests, although we only sent one request.
• Host header: We found that whether the Host
header contains “www.” in the domain name has
a significant effect on the number of websites un-
available. For both Selenium and Requests, adding
a “www.” resulted in a number of websites fail-
ing at the DNS-level. For some of these this is
because the domains already have a subdomain
prepended to the second-level domain (for exam-
ple, pages.tmall.com). However, not pre-pending
“www.” does not necessarily work for all the web-
sites. For example, target.com and ebc.net.tw re-
turn a 200 OK when fetched with a “www.” in
the header, but return a 403 when fetched with-
out a “www.”. To investigate this further, we
checked the behavior of three major browsers and
observed inconsistent behavior for when they add
“www.”.
• Cookie header (relevant in HTTP redirects):
The default behavior in Requests is to not main-
tain state across HTTP requests and to not send a
Cookie-Header in 3XX redirects. Servers could use
this behavior to identify our crawler as automated
and block it. Although we did not find evidence of
this in our top 500 Alexa sample, as a precaution,
we perform fetches with a Session object, which
maintains state across requests.
Given these findings, we opted to use Python’s Re-
quests package with a timeout of 30 seconds and a User
Agent of
Mozilla/5.0 (Macintosh; Intel Mac OS X
10 11 6) AppleWebKit/537.36 (KHTML, like
Gecko) Chrome/66.0.3359.139 Safari/537.36
Our crawler attempts to load all pages with HTTP, but
follows any automatic switches to HTTPS. Given the
server-dependent behavior of “www.”, we first attempt
the domain exactly as it is listed in the list of URLs
we used. If the DNS resolution fails and the URL lacks
the “www.” prefix, we try adding it. If it resolves, we
provide the modified URL to the crawler.
3.2 URL List and Vantage points
We run the measurements from 16 different vantage
points. The machines are spread across nine countries
(Botswana, Bulgaria, Kenya, Pakistan, South Africa,
UK, Ukraine, and USA), and belong to a mix of network
types (institutional, home, VPNs, and cloud). Table 1
lists our vantage points.
Website list: Our list of website URLs consists of:
(i) the top 500 global websites, (ii) the top 500 regional
websites for each of the countries where we have vantage
points as well as for Bangladesh (where we attempted to
have a vantage), and (iii) the top 500 websites accord-
ing to Alexa in the following categories: news, shop-
ping, business (including banks), reference (including
educational and universities websites), science, recre-
ation (including traveling and airline websites), games,
computers (including technology companies websites),
and home (e.g., personal finance). The resulting list
contains 7081 unique URLs that form the subject of
our study.
4. FINDING REGIONAL BLOCKING
In this section, we discuss our methods for finding re-
gional blocking, and for the high-confidence candidates,
establishing that the blocking happens at the server-
side, as opposed to middlebox interference.
4.1 Datasets
We collected data for each vantage in Table 1 three
times between May 18 and 20, 2018, yielding three
views of each URL from each vantage (with the ex-
ception of the Islamabad vantage for which we do not
have data from the first day). Our collection logs record
the raw HTML response (if present), as well as meta-
information such as HTTP response codes and any er-
rors.
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Table 1: Vantage Server Locations
USA Berkeley home
USA Berkeley institutional
USA Berkeley institutional VPN
USA Los Angeles VPN
Botswana Gaborone ISP
Kenya Nairobi ISP
South Africa Johannesburg ISP
South Africa Johannesburg cloud
Pakistan Lahore institutional
Pakistan Lahore dorm
Pakistan Lahore home
Pakistan Islamabad home
Ukraine Kiev VPN
Bulgaria Sofia VPN
United Kingdom London VPN
India Mumbai VPN
4.2 Finding Regional Blocking Candidates
We start with a broad list of websites being unavail-
able due to any reason, and then narrow them down to
candidates for regional blocking.
Identifying Unavailable Sites.
We identify any site resulting in an error (such as,
TCP connection error, DNS error) or serving a non-
20X response as unavailable. We also include 200 OK
responses that show a blockpage. To do so, we leverage
block-page identification regexes from our prior work [31].
From the raw results, it is easy to find many instances
of URLs being unavailable to a vantage in Table 1. How-
ever, we are not interested in mere unavailability, which
could be caused by network failures. So, we first iden-
tify those URLs that are likely blocked (intentionally
unavailable) at a regional scale. Our later analysis will
tease apart different types of blocking and regional fo-
cuses.
Short-listing URLs.
As a first step, we use automated means to short-list
a number of URLs small enough for manual analysis in
a way that focuses our attention on those most likely to
be blocked at the regional scale. Figure 1 provides an
overview of our approach.
To find regional-level differences, and not just network-
level ones, we aggregate results across all the vantages
within a region. We examine three regions: the US,
Pakistan, and Africa. Given that complaints of regional
blocking often come from the developing world, we par-
ticularly focus on finding websites available in the US
but not Pakistan or Africa.
Since our goal is to have high-confidence in our claims
that some websites engage in server-side blocking, of re-
gions in particular, as opposed to finding all instances
of it, we do not treat the two sides of these comparisons
equally. For the US, we aim to underestimate the avail-
ability of websites while for the developing region, we
aim to overestimate it. This difference helps to ensure
that we underestimate the number of sites available in
the US but not in the developing region, thereby, con-
trolling the false positive rate for claims of server-side
blocking of regions.
With this in mind, to aggregate the results within a
region, we use minimum availability for the US and the
maximum availability for the developing region. That
is, we only short-list URLs that always were available
in the US and never were available in the developing
region. This is a high bar, but in addition to helping to
control for false positives, it captures the intuition that
such blocking involves blocking whole regions at a time.
Furthermore, to help ensure that the differences were
systematic, and not just the result of network issues, we
throw out those URLs that were not always unavailable
in the developing region in the same manner. For exam-
ple, we do not short-list a URL that failed to load from
Botswana due to a DNS failure and from Kenya due to
a missing SYN-ACK, since the availability might come
from two different unintentional network issues prevent-
ing the connection. Again, while this is a high bar, it
is motivated by the intuition that region-wide blocking
entails a single blanket block of a region, not many little
blocks. Furthermore, the intent that is suggested from
the uniformity of the unavailability moves the finding
from mere unavailability to a suggestion of active block-
ing. However, we acknowledge that, in addition to pos-
sibly eliminating from our short list actual instances of
regional server-side blocking that were mixed with net-
work failures, our short list might include unintentional
unavailability from network failures large enough to af-
fect all of our vantages in a region.
Manual Checks.
To ensure that our crawler did not introduce arti-
facts into our data, we manually loaded each short-
listed URL from locations in the apparently blocked
region. For Pakistan, we loaded them manually with
the Chrome browser from two vantage points in La-
hore, one of them not present in our crawl measure-
ments. For Africa, we lacked a physical presence and
instead manually operated Selenium over SSH connec-
tions to our Johannesburg cloud vantage point, which,
unfortunately, could introduce artifacts similar to our
automated crawls with the Requests package.
4.3 Establishing Server-side Blocking
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USA Crawler 7081 records 5233 always available
7081 URLs Intersection 52 short listed
PAK Crawler 7081 records 300 always unavailable 242 always same problem
Figure 1: Short-listing URLs. As an example, we show the results for comparing Pakistan to the US.
While the above approach identifies blocking, that is,
persistent (and, thus, probably intentional) unavailabil-
ity, it cannot distinguish between server-side blocking,
client-side ISP blocking, and censorship implemented
with a middlebox. In fact, even an explicit block page
could be injected by a censor instead of coming from
the requested server. The short-listed URLs could rep-
resent websites censored by each country in the devel-
oping region. Thus, we take steps to determine which of
the short-listed URLs are unavailable due to server-side
blocking.
Being able to reach the server rules out the quintessen-
tial form of transnational censorship: the client’s gov-
ernment blocking of requests leaving its country. How-
ever, it does leave open two less discussed forms of cen-
sorship: (1) the client country blocking returning re-
sponses, and (2) the server’s country blocking connec-
tions. In the second case, the server’s government could
do so either directory using its own network infrastruc-
ture or indirectly by pressuring the server into blocking
the connection itself.
On the flip side, it is possible that a website imple-
ments a a block by outsourcing the blocking to network
infrastructure between it and the would-be visitors. In
some sense, a website operator using CDN controls is an
example of such, but in such cases, our measurements
treat the CDN as the website’s server. A more tricky
case of this is websites purposefully providing unhelpful
DNS records to some DNS resolvers.
With all this in mind, we do not believe it is possi-
ble to perfectly distinguish between server’s choices and
censorship. Nevertheless, we further restrict our atten-
tion to those cases where we can determine that server
is at least reachable from the vantage.
Traceroute.
To determine whether the server or a middlebox is
responding to our requests, we use traceroute to deter-
mine how far requests for a particular unavailable web-
site make it. We consider only those URLs that produce
consistent traceroute lengths to have reached the web-
site server. Out approach is inspired by the work of Xu
et al., who use traceroute to determine where in China
the censorship occurs [55].
We first use an ICMP-traceroute to establish a base
number of hops that a given server is away, since with
good likelihood the ICMP echo packets do not experi-
ence response-path middlebox interference. We com-
pute response-path lengths as follows: If the ICMP
traceroute completes, we use the first hope where re-
sponding IP address equals the destination server IP
address. If the traceroute does not complete with
a response from the intended destination, we underap-
proximate the distance to the server by using the length
to the last responding hop.
Next, we perform a TCP-SYN traceroute using TCP-
SYN packets with increasing TTLs. If we receive a re-
sponse for TCP, we use the first hop from where we
receive a TCP packet as the length of the TCP tracer-
oute. In the case, where we do not receive a response
our test ends inconclusively since on possible explana-
tion is a middlebox blocking the test but another is the
server dropping the packets.
Given the two traceroutes, we use two methods for
identifying middlebox interference:
1. If the TCP response-path length is shorter than
the ICMP path length by more than 3 hops, we flag
it as likely to be middlebox interference. We use
threshold of 3 since the path lengths can fluctuate
to some extent even in the case of no middlebox
interference.
2. If the TCP response received is spoofed, we flag
it as likely to be middle box interference. We de-
tect a spoofed response when we receive an ICMP
response and the TCP response for the same hop
from two different IP addresses. Note that this
check only detects the middlebox in cases where it
sends an ICMP response from its own IP address
in addition to sending a spoofed TCP response.
If the TCP traceroute does not find a middlebox using
the above methods, we check using a stateful HTTP
traceroute. We send HTTP GET request packets with
increasing TTLs. Similarly to before, this could end
inconclusively if we do not receive a HTTP response.
We apply the same heuristics used for TCP to compare
the HTTP traceroute to the ICMP traceroute.
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If the tests are not inconclusive and we do not find
interference from either the TCP or HTTP test, we con-
clude that the server is responding to our requests and
the block is server-side.
Our method can both falsely flag a block as server-
side and miss some server-side blocking. False posi-
tives will arise from middleboxes being 3 or less hops
from the website and not returning an ICMP packet
with their true address when they send a spoofed re-
sponse (since we fail to detect spoofing in such a cir-
cumstance). While we would like to eliminate these
false positives, such close middleboxes very well may
be under the control the website anyhow. We will fail
to confirm server-side blocking when our traceroutes do
not receive the TCP responses needed for the above
calculations, such as from silent server or middlebox
blocking. This approach also does not work websites
that implement blocks with DNS poisoning, although
arguably, that is not truly server-side blocking despite
being caused by the website.
4.4 Whitelisting vs. Blacklisting
Let us distinguish between two types of region-based
blocking. In whitelisting, a website aims to serve its
content to only visitors within a targeted region. In
blacklisting, a website aims to exclude certain regions.
Strictly speaking, this is again, the sort of property that
cannot be measured since a large enough blacklist will
look like a whitelist and a large enough whitelist will
look like a blacklist. However, we can identify cases
where a website appears to only be reachable within its
country, which is a strong suggestion of whitelisting. As
for identifying likely blacklisting, a website being reach-
able to some but not all regions outside of its country
with no clear basis related to the website’s purpose sug-
gests blacklisting. With this in mind, we looked at how
websites treat regions other than two compared in the
above methods.
Comparison to Other Regions.
To judge whether the regional blocking we have ob-
served is likely motivated by whitelisting or blacklisting,
we look at measurements from other regions.
In particular, we use three measurements from across
Europe. We selected Great Britain to be an English-
speaking, highly developed country, unlikely to be black-
listed. We selected Bulgaria as a country that presents
security risks to websites due to the presence of hack-
ers [11]. We selected Ukraine for similar reasons. We
could see both these countries being blacklisted for se-
curity reasons. We also included India as a country
similar to Pakistan.
Since our vantages in these countries are all VPNs,
we must take findings of unavailability to possibly be
indicative not of geo-blocking, but of VPN blocking.
However, we accept findings of availability as indicating
availability. (We took steps to confirm that the VPNs
were actually in the countries claimed, which was not
the case for some VPNs we tried previously.) For a
short-listed URL, we take a URL being available in all
the European locations as a strong signal of blacklisting
and being available only in the US as a strong signal
of whitelisting. Results in between these extremes are
more ambiguous.
4.5 Limitations
Despite taking these precautions, false positives re-
main possible. At the most fundamental level, the mea-
sures we took cannot distinguish between a web master
blocking a region as a region and blocking the individ-
ual IP addresses that make up region after judging each
individually by some other criteria. However, this does
not negate that the server is using server-side block-
ing that is affecting a region. Furthermore, given the
vagaries of geo-locating IP addresses, it is unlikely that
even a web master determined to block a whole country
will succeed without overestimating to a great deal.
We only sample the vantages of each region. While
we took steps to ensure a diversity of vantages, it re-
mains possible that that rather than whole countries
being blocked, just the networks from which we mea-
sured were blocked. Scaling up our measures to more
vantages could address this limitation. Nevertheless, we
show that some parts of some regions are being affected
by server-side blocking.
On the other hand, by consistently opting to be con-
servative in our accusations of server-side blocking, we
may have missed many instances of it. In particular,
we will miss instances due to network errors causing
the website to be unavailable in different ways in ad-
dition to server-side blocking. Similarly, we will also
miss server-side blocking using more than one method.
Furthermore, we will miss websites blocking with DNS
blocking or other methods that thwart a connection be-
tween researching the website, although it is debatable
whether such blocks are truly server-side.
5. RESULTS
Overall, every vantage point experienced some form
of blocking (Table 2). Table 3 shows the final results
for Pakistan and Africa.
As expected, we found evidence that websites in the
US engage in blocking by blacklisting developing regions
(Table 6 and Table 4). More unexpectedly, by flipping
the roles of the US and Pakistan in the methods de-
scribed in Section 4, we found evidence that websites
within developing countries block the US (Table 5).
Another unexpected pattern was the high degree of
blocking of Pakistan by websites in India. With only
a single VPN vantage in India, we cannot have high
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Location/response 2XX 403 4XX (Other) 503 5XX (Other) Conn. Err DNS Err Other Timed Out Total
USA, Berkeley, ICSI 6871.00 56.67 37.33 22.67 2.67 10.67 2.33 36.33 41.33 7081
USA, Berkeley, Home 6758.00 59.67 45.67 21.67 4.67 14.00 65.67 11.00 100.67 7081
USA, UC Berkeley (VPN) 6784.67 56.67 39.33 24.00 3.00 19.67 94.00 18.00 41.67 7081
USA, LA (VPN) 6437.00 69.00 52.00 24.33 7.00 16.00 385.67 9.00 81.00 7081
PAK, Lahore (Institutional) 6218.00 96.00 43.00 28.00 2.00 4.00 3.00 129.00 558.00 7081
PAK, Lahore (Home) 6595.00 113.00 56.00 28.00 3.00 16.00 152.00 40.00 78.00 7081
PAK, Islamabad (home) 6689.00 109.00 53.00 26.00 3.00 50.00 54.00 10.00 87.00 7081
PAK, Lahore (Dorm) 6662.00 108.00 48.00 29.00 4.00 90.00 48.00 9.00 83.00 7081
ZAF, Johannesburg (ISP) 6791.00 86.67 48.00 28.67 6.67 15.33 35.00 9.33 60.33 7081
KEN, Nairobi (ISP) 6802.33 83.00 49.33 24.00 5.00 17.33 35.00 9.67 55.33 7081
BWA, Gaborone (ISP) 6819.33 76.67 44.67 21.33 4.67 17.33 36.00 6.00 55.00 7081
ZAF, Johannesburg (Cloud) 6836.00 85.33 47.33 26.33 5.00 3.33 3.67 8.67 65.33 7081
BGR, Sofia (VPN) 6649.33 97.00 52.67 27.67 6.67 23.33 108.00 12.00 104.33 7081
GBR, London (VPN) 6725.33 71.67 43.67 23.00 4.67 16.33 122.33 12.33 61.67 7081
IND, Mumbai (VPN) 6467.00 85.67 45.00 25.33 4.00 25.00 44.67 8.00 376.33 7081
UKR, Kiev (VPN) 6583.33 158.00 57.33 34.00 5.00 23.67 104.67 10.67 104.33 7081
Table 2: Crawling result
Table 3: Overall Results for Pakistan and Africa.
The number of URLs falling into each category
is shown.
Category PAK Africa
Short-listed URLs
Manually available
With CAPTCHA
With delay
Without issues
Not manually available
Traceroute inconclusive
DNS error
No SYN-ACK
Traceroute conclusive
Stopped short
Made it to server
52
10
7
3
0
42
28
11
15
14
0
14
21
2
1
1
0
19
6
0
6
13
0
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confidence about the unavailability of websites in that
country, but we can confirm with high confidence that
Pakistan is blocked by up and running Indian websites.
This finding could be explained by the tensions between
the countries having lead to tit-for-tat vigilante hackers
from each country attacking websites in the other [13].
(Relatedly, there are reports of Pakistan censoring In-
dian websites [46].)
The results for our black/whitelisting tests were more
mixed than we expected. For example, peapod.com
works only in the US and in Botswana, producing a
403 for every other vantage. We suspect this is a case of
whitelisting with a geo-location error for the ISP-based
vantage in Botswana.
The website sunpass.com, which starts out “Wel-
come Florida Visitors! Planning a vacation to Florida?”
blocks all our vantages outside the US and Great Britain.
Perhaps, the website decided that only those from the
Anglosphere, narrowly construed, would like to visit
Florida.
hud.gov could be another such example, with an
additional geo-location error affecting our vantage in
Kenya. This website, about housing from the US gov-
ernment may be an interesting example of a government
deciding to block access as a server operator, instead of
as a censor. Or, given that all the blocking came from
DNS errors, a misconfiguration.
At the opposite end of the spectrum, 12 websites
block only Pakistan, with three being confirmed server-
side blocking. Nine of them, and all three confirmed
server-side blockers, are hosted in India and may be
explained by the aforementioned tensions between Pak-
istan and India. Others may be instances of tight black-
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URL/Country BWA KEN ZAF PAK BGR UKR IND GBR USA
kirklands.com 403 403 403 403† 403 403 403 403 200
panerabread.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200
gasbuddy.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200
publix.com TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 200
pizzahut.com 403 403 403 403† 403 403 403 200 200
sunpass.com TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 200 200
www.allconnect.comCE CE CE CE CE CE 200 CE 200
forumodua.com 503 503 503 503 503 200 503 503 200
funimation.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200 200
tombola.co.uk 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200 200
safeway.com 403 403 403 403† 403 403 200 403 200
apartments.com 403 403 403 403† 200 403 200† 200 200
duke-energy.com DE DE DE† DE DE DE 200 200 200
cgg.gov.in 403 403 403 DE 403 403 200 200 200
odeon.co.uk TO TO TO TO TO TO 200 200 200
lendingtree.com 403 403 403 403 200 403 200 200 200
restaurant.com CE CE TO† CE† CE 200 200 200 200
pbteen.com 403 403 403 CE† 200 200 200 200 200
potterybarn.com 403 403 403 200† 200 200 200 200 200
pikabu.ru TO TO TO 200 200 200 200 200 200
williams-
sonoma.com
403 403 403 200 200 200 200 200 200
Table 4: Websites accessible in the US and inaccessible
in Africa. red = Not available manually and true server
side blocking, orange = Not available manually but un-
verified who is blocking, green = Manually available,
yellow = Not checked manually, *200 = Block page
with a 200-OK status code, 200 = The website some-
times loads with a 200-OK status, † = Majority status
of the responses, DE = DNS Error, CE = Connection
error, TO = time out and RD = Too many redirects.
URL/Country USA IND GBR BGR BWAKEN ZAF UKR PAK
joinpaknavy.gov.pkTO TO CE TO† TO TO TO† TO 200
joinpakarmy.gov.pkTO TO CE† TO TO TO† TO TO 200
parfums.ua 403 403 403 403 200 200 200 200 200
24video.sexy 403 200 403 200 200 200 200 200 200
subscene.com 503 200† 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
jrj.com.cn TO 200† 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Table 5: Websites accessible in PAK and inaccessible in
the USA. red = Not available manually and true server
side blocking, orange = Not available manually but un-
verified who is blocking, green = Manually available,
yellow = Not checked manually, *200 = Block page
with a 200-OK status code, 200 = The website some-
times loads with a 200-OK status, † = Majority status
of the responses, DE = DNS Error, CE = Connection
error, TO = time out and RD = Too many redirects.
listing due to some previous issue with Pakistan, such
as abuse. Two websites (pikabu.ru and williams-
sonoma.com) blocked all and only the vantages in Africa.
Two Pakistani websites (joinpaknavy.gov.pk and joinpakarmy.
gov.pk) block all vantage points outside Pakistan.
We found the following types of blocking:
1. Geo blocking: Websites explicitly mention that
the country is blocked. For example, when loaded
from London, jcpenney.com shows a message say-
ing “We are currently unable to provide a shopping
experience for this country.”
2. Block page with a way to bypass: Websites
show a static block page with a captcha or a
browser-check page. In both cases, the websites
load after extra work from the client side.
3. Block page with a way to bypass: Websites
show a static block page without any way to by-
pass. These cases include the Akamai block page
saying “Access Denied”.
4. Non-HTTP errors:
Some websites block by blocking the DNS request,
resetting or aborting connection and by respond-
ing to the request to cause time out.
6. WHY BLOCKING HAPPENS
Numerous possibilities exist for why a website, or
content on it, would be available from Berkeley but
not Africa or Pakistan. Some websites, for example
YouTube, explicitly state the reason of content licence
restrictions. We also found a small number of block-
pages that explicitly say that the reason is securty con-
cerns. For example, lendingtree.com blocks access
from Pakistan by security rules (Figure 2). However,
often, no reason is provided, as shown in Tables 6 and
Table 4. With this in mind, we looked elsewhere for
evidence that such blocking exists.
We first looked for blocking motivated by reducing
the costs associated with security and fraud in particu-
lar. We searched for webpages intended for webmasters
that discuss such blocking. We found a forum discus-
sion in which the original poster complains of fraudulent
orders using stolen credit cards [42]. The poster asserts
that sometimes the orders are to “the stolen card owners
real USA address” and claims that “They are doing this
for no reason other than to be annoying.” For this rea-
son, the poster says that not shipping to Africa would
not fix the problem and asks “Is it possible to block
african traffic by IP?” Other forum posters shared tech-
nical approaches to blocking web traffic by country and
addition complaints about traffic from some countries.
For example, one forum poster wrote
In the past, we’ve had alot of trouble with
Nigerian orders. We’ve had many an order
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URL/Country PAK UKR BGR IND ZAF KEN BWA GBR USA
panerabread.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200
gasbuddy.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200
publix.com TO TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 200
forumodua.com 503 200 503 503 503 503 503 503 200
funimation.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200 200
sunpass.com TO TO TO TO TO TO TO 200 200
www.allconnect.com CE CE CE 200 CE CE CE CE 200
peapod.com 403 403 403 403 403 403 200 403 200
tombola.co.uk 403 403 403 403 403 403 403 200 200
cgg.gov.in DE 403 403 200 403 403 403 200 200
northerntool.com 403 403 403 403 403 200 200 403† 200
odeon.co.uk TO TO TO 200 TO TO TO 200 200
hud.gov DE DE DE DE DE† 200 DE 200 200
duke-energy.com DE DE DE 200 DE† DE DE 200 200
uhaul.com TO TO 200 TO 200† 200 200 TO 200
lendingtree.com 403 403 200 200 403 403 403 200 200
tigerdirect.com 403 403 403 200 200 403 403 200 200
payless.com DE DE DE 200 200† 200 DE 200 200
orvis.com 403 403 403 403 200 403 200 200 200
www.home-barista.com 503 503 503 200 503 200 200 200 200
moneytalksnews.com 403 200 403 403 403 200 200 200 200
ap.gov.in DE 200 TO 200† 200 200 200 200 200
telegra.ph TO 200 200 TO 200 200 200 200† 200
poloniex.com 403 403† 200 403 200 200 200 200 200
expekt.com RD 200 RD RD† 200 200 200 200 200
www.playstation.com 404 200 200 200 200 404 404 200 200
idbibank.co.in TO 200 200 200† 200 200 200 200 200
dish.com TO TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
bankbazaar.com 403 403 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
brickset.com 403 403 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
nazk.gov.ua DE 200 200 DE 200 200 200 200 200
tax.virginia.gov DE DE 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
wipro.com TO 200 200† 200 200 200 200 200 200
carandclassic.co.uk *200 200 200 *200 200 200 200 200 200
indianbank.net.in CE 200 200 200† 200 200 200 200 200
revenue.alabama.gov TO TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
mahaonline.gov.in *200† 200 200 200 200 *200 200 200 200
hotukdeals.com 403 200 200 403 200 200 200 200 200
iasri.res.in DE DE 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
lpu.in TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
anandabazar.com 403 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
x-minus.me 503 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
uidai.gov.in DE 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
snapdeal.com 403 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
vodafone.in TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
incometaxindiaefiling.gov.inDE 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
ukwhitegoods.co.uk CE 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
atariage.com TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
telangana.gov.in TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
telegraphindia.com 403 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
t.me CE 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
toto.bg TO 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200
Table 6: Websites accessible in the US and inaccessible in Pakistan. red = Not available manually and true server
side blocking, orange = Not available manually but unverified who is blocking, green = Manually available, yellow
= Not checked manually, *200 = Block page with a 200-OK status code, 200 = The website sometimes loads with a
200-OK status, † = Majority status of the responses, DE = DNS Error, CE = Connection error, TO = time out and
RD = Too many redirects.
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Figure 2: Example of block pages
from Lagos, Sweden. But we purchased an
annual service from StoreIQ to block a list
of countries that we specify. Haven’t had a
single Nigerian order since.
(Lagos is a city in Nigeria, not Sweden.) Another writes
“I nuked most of China about a year ago because of
some really obnoxious activity on the web site (not nec-
essarily fraudulent orders).” and that “I can’t imagine
any reason someone in Nigeria needs to even *see* my
web site, let alone place an order on it.” Others wrote
about tricking users into thinking the website is down:
[Our systems] redirect any one from a list of
chosen countries sent to a page on our site
which says our site is down. This way they
will think something is wrong with our site
and not come back. It seems to work as there
is less trafic now from those countires.
and “I [. . . ] send all traffic from offending countries to a
mock 404 page.” Another poster says “instead of a 404
we redirect all Nigerian traffic the the FBI’s Internet
Fraud Complaint Center, just for fun.”
Another website sets up a discussion of technical meth-
ods of blocking as follows [20]:
I admin ecom website and a lot of bogus traf-
fic comes from countries that do not offer
much in commercial value. How do I just
configure Apache or iptables to just refuse
connections to certain countries?
A similar how-to website [39] starts
It’s a sad fact that the majority of malicious
web traffic to US sites originates from the
same handful of foreign countries. If your
site doesn’t benefit from actual users living
in those countries, you may resolve to block
them from accessing your site entirely in or-
der to prevent repeated attacks.
A website provides lists of IP addresses by country
for blocking “to minimize on-line fraud, SPAM, floods
or brute force attacks” [44].
Our search of social media found not only reports of
blocking, but also occasionally a response from the web-
site in question. President’s Choice Financial explicitly
cited security as the motivation [43]. Macy’s claimed
that the reason was not shipping to the country in ques-
tion without explaining why that entails blocking [35].
(Macy’s did not reply when the affected user said she
wanted to ship to a US address.)
From these sources, we conclude that at least some
webmasters would like to block countries due to con-
cerns about fraud or otherwise undesired traffic orig-
inating from them. Furthermore, it appears common
enough that how-to websites provide advice on doing
so. However, we have not determined what percentage
of blocking occurs for this reason.
We also looked for evidence that websites might be
sensitive to the costs associated with servicing traffic
from some countries. Fastly’s content delivery network
(CDN) offers points of presence across the world, in-
cluding one in South Africa [19]. We found that Fastly
charges more for serving requests from some regions
than others. For example, South Africa is more than
twice as expensive as North America [18]. It is possible
that websites have decided to not serve traffic to regions
with higher fees and low expectations for revenue. As
with security, we have not attempted to quantify how
common this practice is.
7. DISCUSSION
Interpreting our results requires care to not jump to
unwarranted conclusions. We have measured server-
side blocking that affects some regions more than oth-
ers. While we have documented some stated causes for
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such blocking, we have not quantitatively measured the
effect size of each. Furthermore, except for a small num-
ber (at least two, see Figure 2) of blockpages explicitly
stating that geo-blocking is the cause, we do not know
which causes lead to the blocking we measured. Even
in these cases, we cannot be sure of the motivations
behind the geo-blocking. For example, recall the web
master posts about using misleading block pages. Also,
many websites hosted on Akamai or Cloudflare inadver-
tently block Tor users without knowing that they do so
because they use the abuse protection from the content
delivery networks (CDNs) [31]. Perhaps misconfigura-
tion or poorly understood configuration led to some of
our findings as well.
One may wish to drawn conclusions about issues such
as censorship or discrimination from our findings. While
precisely defining these terms and measuring such high-
level social impacts are beyond the scope of this work,
we can say something about the relationship between
our measurements of server-side blocking of regions and
these higher-level concepts.
For most definitions of censorship, our method counts
a strict subset of censorship but also blocking that does
meet the definition. Typically, censorship implies that
both parties in a communication are willing partici-
pants and that a third-party (paradigmatically, a gov-
ernment) disrupts the communication. Our method
counts server-side blocking taken up not only due to
orders issued by a government (such as with economic
sanctions [7]) but also that taken up for voluntary rea-
sons not involving a third party. On the other hand,
we do not count censorship implemented with middle-
boxes, its quintessential form.
One may wish to say that we have measured some or
all of the other possible voluntary reasons for a server
to block a region, such as asserting that we measured
discrimination. However, we only detect blocking for
such reasons that is implemented by server-side block-
ing. We would miss any implemented with middleboxes,
which, at least in theory, could happen if the website
pays a government to block requests crossing its boarder
headed for the website.
As for discrimination, can we at least say we are
measuring the subset of it implemented as server-side
blocking? The answer depends upon the definition of
discrimination used. For some, such those requiring big-
otry or intent, we cannot draw such a conclusion.
However, we have shown some regions to be dispro-
portionately affected by a website’s use of server-side
blocking. For employment, US anti-discrimination law
makes illegal some cases of disproportionate impact,
namely, those that constitute disparate impact. Dis-
parate impact is a complex legal doctrine. (For a dis-
cussion related to CS, see [6].) We will not argue that
we found disparate impact, but we do find it helpful to
draw an analogy to it. In particular, we note that an
action can lead to disparate impact even when it and
the reasons behind it are facially neutral towards all
groups and do not involve animosity, for example, when
it is correlated with one of the groups. Furthermore,
disparate impact can happen even when not everyone
in the affected group experiences the adverse outcome.
Nor does disparate impact have to be wide spread in
the sense of many employers committing it. Finally, un-
der the doctrine, disproportionate effects are concerning
enough to warrant a justification and in the absence of
such justification can be problematic (and illegal in that
setting). We also borrow the concept that such justi-
fications should be strong, in their setting a business
necessity.
We believe our findings are concerning enough to war-
rant justifications in the same sense. In particular, our
study does not determine whether differences in avail-
ability between regions is caused by geo-blocking the
affected region or by some other factor correlated with
it. We also do not show that everyone in the affected
region experiences it nor that it is wide spread across
many websites. However, under our analogy, these is-
sues do not diminish the need for a strong justification.
As for what would count as a strong justification,
we get little guidance from our analogy since the con-
text of employment differs greatly from that of serving
webpages. We will leave it to the reader to weigh the
justifications found in Section 6.
8. CONCLUSION
While small in scale, our network measurements pro-
vide reasonably strong evidence that some websites are
available from the United States but not from various
locations in Africa and Pakistan (Section 5). We have
also established that at least some websites claim that
the reason for theirs being so is fraud concerns or not
shipping to the location (Section 6). We also found
forum discussions relating a desire to block countries
due to concerns over fraud and that traffic can be more
expensive in Africa (Section 6). However, we cannot
attribute all the measured difference in availability to
these reasons.
Despite the uncertainties surrounding the causes of
our findings and how to refer to them, we believe they
should be a cause for concern. The limitations created
by such blocks can pose impediments to commerce in
developing regions, either directly by preventing pur-
chases or indirectly by making examples of successful
e-commence sites harder to come by.
Furthermore, decisions about blocking remain opaque
to the affected users: for them, things simply do not
work, with little explanation as to why. For example,
Akamai-hosted websites show a static page to blocked
locations simply stating “Access Denied”, without any
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explanation of the underlying issue that led to the block-
ing, and with the blog page on the issue being a laundry
list of possibilities [3]. Users may infer the worst, such
as xenophobia, creating a sense of oppression even if
webmasters have legitimate concerns about security.
Even in such cases, wide-net geo-blocking, such as
the desire to block all of Africa we found (Section 6),
could represent an overreaction that ignores the great
diversity in Africa. In addition to future research on
measuring and understanding the server-side blocking
identified in this work, research could provide webmas-
ters with tools that allow cost-effective fine-grain block-
ing in hopes of preventing such overreactions.
In addition to being interesting in their own right and
raising questions of regional justice, our results have
implications for censorship measurements. Censorship
measurements that do not tease server-side blocking
apart from censorship risks overestimating censorship.
Furthermore, the focus of Western researchers on cen-
sorship in the Eastern world while not acknowledging
the server-side blocking existing in their own countries
risks biasing the discussion of openness on the Internet.
Acknowledgment
We thank David Fifield for allowing us to use some of
his code. We thank the ISP that allowed us to use their
servers. We gratefully acknowledge funding support
from the National Science Foundation (Grants 1518918
and 1651857) and UC Berkeley’s Center for Long-Term
Cybersecurity. The opinions in this paper are those of
the authors and do not necessarily reflect the opinions of
any funding sponsor or the United States Government.
9. REFERENCES
[1] Nigerian letter or 419 fraud.
https://www.fbi.gov/scams-and-
safety/common-fraud-schemes/nigerian-
letter-or-419-fraud.
[2] Amazon. Countries accepted for seller
registration: List of accepted countries.
http://www.amazon.com/gp/help/customer/
display.html/ref=hp_rel_topic?ie=UTF8&
nodeId=200417280. Accessed 2015–12–13.
[3] (B-C-MPC4K3), A. Why is akamai blocking
me? Cloud Security Blog:
https://community.akamai.com/community/
cloud-security/blog/2016/04/07/why-is-
akamai-blocking-me, Apr. 2016.
[4] Balebako, R., Leon, P., Shay, R., Ur, B.,
Wang, Y., and Cranor, L. Measuring the
effectiveness of privacy tools for limiting
behavioral advertising. In Web 2.0 Security and
Privacy Workshop (2012).
[5] Barford, P., Canadi, I., Krushevskaja, D.,
Ma, Q., and Muthukrishnan, S. Adscape:
Harvesting and analyzing online display ads. In
Proceedings of the 23rd International Conference
on World Wide Web (Republic and Canton of
Geneva, Switzerland, 2014), International World
Wide Web Conferences Steering Committee,
pp. 597–608.
[6] Barocas, S., and Selbst, A. Big data’s
disparate impact. California Law Review 104
(2016), 671.
[7] Bischof, Z. S., Rula, J. P., and
Bustamante, F. E. In and out of cuba:
Characterizing cuba’s connectivity. In Proceedings
of the 2015 Internet Measurement Conference
(New York, NY, USA, 2015), IMC ’15, ACM,
pp. 487–493.
[8] Book, T., and Wallach, D. S. An empirical
study of mobile ad targeting. ArXiv 1502.06577
(2015).
[9] Burrell, J. Invisible users: Youth in the
Internet cafe´s of urban Ghana. Mit Press, 2012.
[10] Chetty, M., Sundaresan, S., Muckaden, S.,
Feamster, N., and Calandro, E. Measuring
broadband performance in south africa. In
Proceedings of the 4th Annual Symposium on
Computing for Development (New York, NY,
USA, 2013), ACM DEV-4 ’13, ACM, pp. 1:1–1:10.
[11] Constantin, L. Savviest hackers hail from
eastern europe, researchers say. PC World (Sept.
2012). https://www.pcworld.com/article/
2010491/savviest-hackers-hail-from-
eastern-europe-researchers-say.html.
[12] Datta, A., Tschantz, M. C., and Datta, A.
Automated experiments on ad privacy settings: A
tale of opacity, choice, and discrimination. In
Proceedings on Privacy Enhancing Technologies
(PoPETs) (2015), De Gruyter Open.
[13] D’Mello, G. A Pakistani group hacked into 10
Indian university websites as revenge against
Indian hackers. India Times (Apr. 2017). https:
//www.indiatimes.com/technology/news/a-
pakistani-group-hacked-defaced-10-indian-
university-websites-as-retaliation-
against-indian-hackers-276456.html.
[14] Du, B., Demmer, M., and Brewer, E.
Analysis of www traffic in cambodia and ghana.
In Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference on World Wide Web (New York, NY,
USA, 2006), WWW ’06, ACM, pp. 771–780.
[15] Englehardt, S., Eubank, C., Zimmerman,
P., Reisman, D., and Narayanan, A. Web
privacy measurement: Scientific principles,
engineering platform, and new results. Manuscript
posted at http://randomwalker.info/
publications/WebPrivacyMeasurement.pdf,
June 2014. Accessed Nov. 22, 2014.
13
[16] Fanou, R., Francois, P., and Aben, E. On
the diversity of interdomain routing in africa. In
Passive and Active Measurement (Cham, 2015),
J. Mirkovic and Y. Liu, Eds., Springer
International Publishing, pp. 41–54.
[17] Fanou, R., Tyson, G., Francois, P., and
Sathiaseelan, A. Pushing the frontier:
Exploring the african web ecosystem. In
Proceedings of the 25th International Conference
on World Wide Web (Republic and Canton of
Geneva, Switzerland, 2016), WWW ’16,
International World Wide Web Conferences
Steering Committee, pp. 435–445.
[18] Fastly. Bandwidth & requests. Pricing webpage:
https://www.fastly.com/products/load-
balancing, 2018. Accessed Feb. 27, 2018.
[19] Fastly. Traffic scalability. Load balancing
webpage: https:
//www.fastly.com/products/load-balancing,
2018. Accessed Feb. 27, 2018.
[20] Gite, V. Linux iptables just block by country.
nixCraft website:
https://www.cyberciti.biz/faq/block-
entier-country-using-iptables/, Apr. 2017.
[21] Guha, S., Cheng, B., and Francis, P.
Challenges in measuring online advertising
systems. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM
SIGCOMM Conference on Internet Measurement
(New York, NY, USA, 2010), pp. 81–87.
[22] Gupta, A., Calder, M., Feamster, N.,
Chetty, M., Calandro, E., and
Katz-Bassett, E. Peering at the internet’s
frontier: A first look at isp interconnectivity in
africa. In Proceedings of the 15th International
Conference on Passive and Active Measurement -
Volume 8362 (New York, NY, USA, 2014), PAM
2014, Springer-Verlag New York, Inc.,
pp. 204–213.
[23] Hannak, A., Sapiezynski, P.,
Molavi Kakhki, A., Krishnamurthy, B.,
Lazer, D., Mislove, A., and Wilson, C.
Measuring personalization of web search. In
Proceedings of the 22nd International Conference
on World Wide Web (New York, NY, USA,
2013), ACM, pp. 527–538.
[24] Hannak, A., Soeller, G., Lazer, D.,
Mislove, A., and Wilson, C. Measuring price
discrimination and steering on e-commerce web
sites. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on
Internet Measurement Conference (New York,
NY, USA, 2014), ACM, pp. 305–318.
[25] Ihm, S., Park, K., and Pai, V. S. Towards
understanding developing world traffic. In
Proceedings of the 4th ACM Workshop on
Networked Systems for Developing Regions (New
York, NY, USA, 2010), NSDR ’10, ACM,
pp. 8:1–8:6.
[26] Ingold, D., and Soper, S. Amazon doesn’t
consider the race of its customers. should it?
Bloomberg (Apr. 2016).
http://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2016-
amazon-same-day/.
[27] Johnson, D. L., Belding, E. M., Almeroth,
K., and van Stam, G. Internet usage and
performance analysis of a rural wireless network
in macha, zambia. In Proceedings of the 4th ACM
Workshop on Networked Systems for Developing
Regions (New York, NY, USA, 2010), NSDR ’10,
ACM, pp. 7:1–7:6.
[28] Johnson, D. L., Belding, E. M., and van
Stam, G. Network traffic locality in a rural
african village. In Proceedings of the Fifth
International Conference on Information and
Communication Technologies and Development
(New York, NY, USA, 2012), ICTD ’12, ACM,
pp. 268–277.
[29] Johnson, D. L., Pejovic, V., Belding, E. M.,
and van Stam, G. Traffic characterization and
internet usage in rural africa. In Proceedings of
the 20th International Conference Companion on
World Wide Web (New York, NY, USA, 2011),
WWW ’11, ACM, pp. 493–502.
[30] Kende, M., and Rose, K. Promoting local
content hosting to develop the internet ecosystem.
Internet Society Report: https:
//www.internetsociety.org/resources/doc/
2015/promoting-local-content-hosting-to-
develop-the-internet-ecosystem/, Jan. 2015.
[31] Khattak, S., Fifield, D., Afroz, S., Javed,
M., Sundaresan, S., Paxson, V., Murdoch,
S. J., and McCoy, D. Do you see what I see?
Differential treatment of anonymous users. In
Proceedings of the Network and Distributed
System Security Symposium (NDSS) (2016).
[32] Kliman-Silver, C., Hannak, A., Lazer, D.,
Wilson, C., and Mislove, A. Location,
location, location: The impact of geolocation on
web search personalization. In Proceedings of the
2015 ACM Conference on Internet Measurement
Conference (New York, NY, USA, 2015), ACM,
pp. 121–127.
[33] Le´cuyer, M., Ducoffe, G., Lan, F.,
Papancea, A., Petsios, T., Spahn, R.,
Chaintreau, A., and Geambasu, R. XRay:
Increasing the web’s transparency with
differential correlation. In Proceedings of the
USENIX Security Symposium (2014).
[34] Liu, B., Sheth, A., Weinsberg, U.,
Chandrashekar, J., and Govindan, R.
AdReveal: Improving transparency into online
14
targeted advertising. In Proceedings of the Twelfth
ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks (New
York, NY, USA, 2013), ACM, pp. 12:1–12:7.
[35] Macy’s (@Macys). Hi, aliaa our site can only
be viewed from locations we deliver to[. . . ].
Twitter: https://twitter.com/Macys/status/
883133375984349185, July.
[36] McClellan, D. POF scams All about
PlentyofFish catfish scams.
https://socialcatfish.com/pof-scams-
plentyoffish-catfish-scams/.
[37] Mikians, J., Gyarmati, L., Erramilli, V.,
and Laoutaris, N. Detecting price and search
discrimination on the internet. In Proceedings of
the 11th ACM Workshop on Hot Topics in
Networks (New York, NY, USA, 2012), ACM,
pp. 79–84.
[38] Mikians, J., Gyarmati, L., Erramilli, V.,
and Laoutaris, N. Crowd-assisted search for
price discrimination in e-commerce: First results.
In Proceedings of the Ninth ACM Conference on
Emerging Networking Experiments and
Technologies (New York, NY, USA, 2013), ACM,
pp. 1–6.
[39] Mombrea, M. How to block traffic from other
countries in linux. ITworld’s BYTESTREAM
blog: https://www.itworld.com/article/
2833357/security/how-to-block-traffic-
from-other-countries-in-linux.html, Dec.
2013.
[40] Nath, S. Madscope: Characterizing mobile
in-app targeted ads. In Proceedings of the 13th
Annual International Conference on Mobile
Systems, Applications, and Services (New York,
NY, USA, 2015), ACM, pp. 59–73.
[41] Noordally, R., Nicolay, X., Anelli, P.,
Lorion, R., and Tournoux, P. U. Analysis of
internet latency: The reunion island case. In
Proceedings of the 12th Asian Internet
Engineering Conference (New York, NY, USA,
2016), AINTEC ’16, ACM, pp. 49–56.
[42] partipants, F. How can I block African
(Nigerian) traffic from my site? Webmaster World
web forum: https://www.webmasterworld.com/
forum22/3091-2-30.htm.
[43] President’s Choice Financial
(@PCFinancial). Due to security measures, the
pcfinancial.ca website is not accessible in your
current location. (1/2). Twitter:
https://twitter.com/PCFinancial/status/
872094785024274432, June 2017.
[44] Project, I. IPdeny country block downloads.
http://www.ipdeny.com/, Feb. 2018.
[45] Sampson, T. How scammers get free stuff from
Amazon, no questions asked.
http://www.dailydot.com/news/scammers-
amazon-free-replacement-shipments/.
[46] Sholli, S. India SLAMS Pakistan for
‘BLOCKING’ access to websites amid rising
World War 3 fears. Express (May 2018).
https://www.express.co.uk/news/world/
933411/pakistan-india-world-war-3-
websites-jammu-kashmir.
[47] Singh, R., Nithyanand, R., Afroz, S.,
Pearce, P., Tschantz, M. C., Gill, P., and
Paxson, V. Characterizing the nature and
dynamics of Tor exit blocking. In USENIX
Security (Aug. 2017).
[48] Soeller, G., Karahalios, K., Sandvig, C.,
and Wilson, C. MapWatch: Detecting and
monitoring international border personalization
on online maps. In Proceedings of the 25th
International Conference on World Wide Web
(Republic and Canton of Geneva, Switzerland,
2016), International World Wide Web
Conferences Steering Committee, pp. 867–878.
[49] Sweeney, L. Discrimination in online ad
delivery. Commun. ACM 56, 5 (May 2013), 44–54.
[50] Trame`r, F., Atlidakis, V., Geambasu, R.,
Hsu, D. J., Hubaux, J., Humbert, M., Juels,
A., and Lin, H. FairTest: Discovering
unwarranted associations in data-driven
applications. In 2017 IEEE European Symposium
on Security and Privacy, EuroS&P (2017), IEEE,
pp. 401–416.
[51] Tschantz, M. C., Datta, A., Datta, A., and
Wing, J. M. A methodology for information flow
experiments. In Computer Security Foundations
Symposium (2015), IEEE.
[52] Vissers, T., Nikiforakis, N., Bielova, N.,
and Joosen, W. Crying wolf? On the price
discrimination of online airline tickets. In 7th
Workshop on Hot Topics in Privacy Enhancing
Technologies (HotPETs 2014) (July 2014).
[53] Wills, C. E., and Tatar, C. Understanding
what they do with what they know. In
Proceedings of the 2012 ACM Workshop on
Privacy in the Electronic Society (New York, NY,
USA, 2012), pp. 13–18.
[54] Xing, X., Meng, W., Doozan, D., Feamster,
N., Lee, W., and Snoeren, A. C. Exposing
inconsistent web search results with Bobble. In
Proceedings of the 15th International Conference
on Passive and Active Measurement - Volume
8362 (New York, NY, USA, 2014),
Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., pp. 131–140.
[55] Xu, X., Mao, Z. M., and Halderman, J. A.
Internet censorship in China: Where does the
filtering occur? In Passive and Active
Measurement Conference (Atlanta, GA, USA,
15
2011), Springer, pp. 133–142.
[56] Zaki, Y., Chen, J., Po¨tsch, T., Ahmad, T.,
and Subramanian, L. Dissecting web latency in
ghana. In Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on
Internet Measurement Conference (New York,
NY, USA, 2014), IMC ’14, ACM, pp. 241–248.
[57] Zheleva, M., Schmitt, P., Vigil, M., and
Belding, E. The increased bandwidth fallacy:
Performance and usage in rural zambia. In
Proceedings of the 4th Annual Symposium on
Computing for Development (New York, NY,
USA, 2013), ACM DEV-4 ’13, ACM, pp. 2:1–2:10.
16
